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Introduction
One evening while I was living in Moscow as a student, a Russian friend of mine
invited me to a concert. I was unfamiliar with the band, but he assured me they were one
of the most popular groups in the country. When we arrived at the club at which the
concert was to take place, we were stopped at the door by two strikingly beautiful
Russian women who informed us that the tickets for the concert cost fifteen thousand
rubles – about five hundred dollars. My Russian friend, unperturbed, mentioned the name
of an acquaintance that apparently worked at the club. Although the name meant nothing
to me, the women’s faces lit up and they welcomed us inside without asking for a single
kopek.
This was just one example of how I learned that in Russia, who you know is often
more important than what you do or how much you earn. While the use of one’s personal
connections for access to lavish clubs and expensive concerts might seem like just
another byproduct of post-Soviet excess, it is actually rooted in Soviet traditions that
developed in conditions of shortage. The use of personal connections to gain access to
hard-to-find goods or services is known as blat, and it continues to play an important role
in modern Russian society. In fact, blat – and the corruption that the practice often
engenders – remains the main stumbling block for many firms trying to do business in
Russia. This has been especially true for foreign companies, who have been deterred
from investing in what they see as an unpredictable and difficult to access environment.
Much of this perception is due to the opacity of the Russian business sphere, in which
personal ties and informal agreements are often more important than official contracts.

4

5

By discouraging foreign investment, corruption and blat have stalled development and
made Russia a peripheral player in international business. Russia is still considered to be
an important market for many Western corporations, but the risks of investing there often
outweigh the potential returns. Russia’s unfriendly business climate has deterred foreign
investors, leading to slower growth for the country’s economy as a whole. I argue that
blat, and the corruption that results from it, is the main reason behind Russia’s straggling
performance.
Despite the importance of blat in both the Soviet and post-Soviet environment,
surprisingly little research has been done on the phenomenon. Some of the most
instructive work has been done by Alena Ledeneva, a political scientist who has
contributed extensive research tracing the cultural origins of blat (1998; 2008). Ledeneva
has provided us with the most comprehensive overview of the historic roots and the
cultural characteristics of the phenomenon. She explains blat as an exchange of favors, a
system in which people form personal connections in order to gain access to goods or
services that would otherwise be difficult to obtain. Her more recent studies have
commented on the political aspects of the phenomenon and the role of blat in the Russian
market economy, but do not fully explore the consequences of blat in a business
environment. She also focuses mainly on the consequences of blat for Russians
themselves, and does not address the effect that the phenomenon has on foreign entrants
in the Russian market.
Many recent studies have focused on the post-Soviet business environment, and
the important role that networks and connections play in Russia (e.g. Batjargal, 2003;
Hunter, 2003; Michailova & Worm, 2003). These studies, among others, have found that

6

informal personal connections remain an important factor when doing business in Russia.
In fact, belonging to a business network was often found to be the main determinant of
success in the post-Soviet environment. However, these studies do not always link the
use of connections in the current business environment to the phenomenon of blat. Those
that do refer to blat do not fully explore the cultural origins of the phenomenon. Others
have explored the differences in business ethics between Western and Russian firms, and
the challenges that Western investors face when entering the Russian market (Puffer &
McCarthy, 1995; Ariño et al., 1997; Barnes et al., 1997; Kuznetsov & Kuznetsova, 2005).
These articles emphasize cultural differences between Russian and Western
businesspeople, such as the Russian desire to form close personal relationships with
business partners, and the Western inclination toward more formal arrangements. These
authors have also tended to emphasize the problems associated with Russian corruption.
While these studies are instructive, they do not address the root cultural causes of the
differences between Russian and Western business practices, and therefore leave Western
investors without a full understanding of the Russian business environment.
Previous studies, while informative, have focused on historical, cultural, or
business angles of blat. However, these are just individual pieces of a much larger puzzle.
I hope to contribute to the understanding of the post-Soviet business environment by
providing a more complete picture of blat – a scholarly study of this peculiar cultural
phenomenon. My approach differs from that of other authors in that it gives a
multidisciplinary analysis of blat, with the goal of providing more complete insight into
the challenges of doing business in Russia. By combining cultural and literary evidence,
historical information, and analysis of Russian business practices, I hope to provide a
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comprehensive overview of blat in the Soviet and post-Soviet environment. A more
complete understanding of the use of connections will allow us to better understand the
Russian business environment and how blat affects Western firms.
This paper begins by tracing the origins of blat in Soviet society and examining
the transformation of the phenomenon during the transition to a market economy. It then
looks at the instrumental role blat plays in contemporary Russian business, and how this
distinctly Soviet phenomenon affects Western companies who invest in Russia today. By
looking at the cultural roots of the use of personal connections in Russian business and
examining the experience of Western companies in Russia, I hope to provide additional
insight into the difficulties that foreign companies face when entering the Russian
market. With a fuller understanding of the intricacies and idiosyncrasies of the Russian
business environment, multinational corporations may be better prepared to succeed in
their Russian ventures, or at least better informed when making the decision to invest
there.

I. Blat: The Soviet Economy of Favors
Background
Blat is a uniquely Soviet word that refers to the use of connections to obtain
goods that are in short supply. As the economist Joseph Berliner (1957) eloquently put it,
blat is “one of those many flavored words which are so intimate a part of a particular
culture that they can be only awkwardly rendered in the language of another” (p. 182).
Indeed, the concept of blat is difficult to define. The word implies “the use of personal
influence for obtaining certain favors to which a firm or individual is not legally or
formally entitled” (Berliner, 1957, p. 182). According to political scientist Alena
Ledeneva, who has done more recent work on the phenomenon, the term blat refers to
“the use of personal networks and informal contacts to obtain goods and services in short
supply and to find a way around formal procedures” (1998). Thus, blat involves the use
of personal connections to circumvent the rigidity of the Soviet command economy. In
this chapter, I will attempt to trace the origins of blat and its evolution throughout the
Soviet period.

A working definition of blat
Given its multiple definitions, its evolution over time, and the varied contexts in
which it is used, the term blat can be difficult to define. Ledeneva attempts to summarize
blat’s features with the following definition:
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Blat was an exchange of ‘favours of access’ in conditions of shortages and a state
system of privileges.
A ‘favour of access’ was provided at the public expense.
It served the needs of personal consumption and reorganized the official
distribution of material welfare.
Blat exchange was often mediated and covered by the rhetoric of friendship or
acquaintance: ‘sharing,’ ‘helping out,’ ‘friendly support,’ ‘mutual care,’ etc.
Intertwined with personal networks blat provided access to public resources
through personal channels. (Ledeneva, 1998, p. 37)
This definition can help guide an analysis of whether blat continues to operate in
contemporary Russia. Such analysis, however, also requires a better understanding of the
history of blat, its evolution through the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, and its current
role in the post-Soviet period.
Blat’s significance in the Soviet period can be attributed to the unique nature of
the Soviet command economy. The Soviet Union relied on central planning, rather than
market forces, to determine the operation of its economy. One of the consequences of
such a system was a phenomenon referred to as “repressed inflation.” Repressed inflation
occurs when excess demand on the consumer goods market does not translate into an
appropriate price increase. This, in turn, leads to shortages, because the price of a
particular good does not reflect the level of demand (Brus & Laski, 1983). Indeed,
according to surveys of Soviet citizens, the main difficulty in purchasing necessary items
was simply their absence from store shelves (Grushin, 2003). Thus, while earning money
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was necessary in the Soviet economy, money alone was often not sufficient to obtain
necessary goods and services.
Because many of the goods Soviet consumers demanded were in shortage, people
were often forced to queue in order to obtain access to various items. The culture of
lining up to buy shortage goods is perhaps best described in Vladimir Sorokin’s novel,
The Queue (1983). First published in 1985, the novel depicts the queuing process as a
daily ritual in Soviet life. The novel’s characters must stand in line for hours to purchase
a particular object. Sorokin’s novel satirizes the absurdity of the queuing process as his
characters are forced to sleep on the street to keep their place in line: “Why don’t we all
spread out in the square, comrades? We can keep our places in the queue there” (p. 51).
This process was, of course, a significant use of time for many people. Therefore, the
ability to skip the queue and obtain shortage goods through other means was invaluable.
This is where the so-called “shadow economy” came into play. The term shadow
economy refers to the non-regulated, unreported, or private aspects of economic activity
(Marrese, 1981). Blat and other aspects of the shadow economy compensate for the
inadequacies of the official economy, which is plagued by inefficiency, disequilibria, and
rigidity (Grossman, 1982). As mentioned before, one of the consequences of the official
economy’s inefficiencies is shortage. In conditions of shortage, “there is a crucial need to
establish wide-ranging social exchange networks” (Sampson, 1987, p. 131). Blat was the
practice of establishing and exploiting these social exchange networks, and thus allowed
many Soviet citizens to gain access to otherwise unavailable goods and services.
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History of blat
The term blat dates back to the pre-revolutionary period in Russia. According to
Max Fasmer’s etymological dictionary, the term came to Russia from the Polish blat,
which refers to providing a cover or umbrella for someone, and the Yiddish word blat,
which means close, familiar, or “one of our circle” (1964). The term blat also refers to
petty criminal activity, such as minor theft. For the purposes of this paper, however, we
will analyze the more recent, Soviet understanding of the word, referring to what Alena
Ledeneva terms “the economy of favors” (1998). This usage of the word appeared shortly
after the Bolshevik revolution in 1917.
Most Russian language dictionaries contain only the pre-revolutionary meaning of
blat, referring to minor criminal activity. Furthermore, “blat” is “not a ‘polite’ word and
people of more refined manners are half-embarrassed to use it” (Berliner, 1957, p. 183).
However, an analysis of sources representing everyday life in the 1920s, such as
memoirs, letters, and novels, reveals that the word’s meaning did indeed change
following the revolution. These sources demonstrate that the concept evolved over time
and eventually became a part of the Soviet system (Ledeneva, 1998).
It is difficult to find detailed information about blat during the period from the
1920s to 1940s, most likely due to the questionable nature of the practice and the less
than polite connotations of the word itself. Nonetheless, certain themes reappear in
various sources, particularly in satirical periodicals. One humorous example is a poem
that appeared in the satirical publication Krokodil in 1933. The poem, called “Blat-book,”
jokingly referred to a notebook in which one kept all the contact information of one’s blat
connections, along with notes about what could be obtained from whom. The book was
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like a secret code that instructed the user how to get help: “Just call—and in a minute you
have ‘Nik. Nik.’ He will get you everything you need” (Lebedev-Kumach, 1933). Useful
as this blat-book was, the poem cautioned that anyone in contact with such suspect
characters could wind up at the public prosecutor’s under interrogation.
Other depictions of blat evoked such themes as its use to get jobs for friends and
relatives, or to obtain ration tokens for necessary items (Ledeneva, 1998). Blat was also
used to avoid a reduction in living space, as depicted in the 1925 novel, Heart of a Dog,
by Mikhail Bulgakov. The novel, which was not published in the Soviet Union until
glasnost’, depicts the favors available to well-connected citizens in the 1920s. One of the
main characters, the surgeon Professor Preobrazhensky, is facing a reduction in housing
space. He is able to avoid losing rooms in his apartment, however, by calling in favors to
officials on whom he operates. When the house management committee threatens to
lodge a complaint with the authorities, Preobrazhensky calls the Chairman of the house
committee, who also happens to be his patient. Preobrazhensky threatens to cancel all of
his scheduled operations unless the Chairman issues an order ensuring that nobody “will
be allowed even to approach the door of my apartment. A final and definitive order. An
absolute one! A real one! Ironclad” (Bulgakov, 1968, p. 28). The Chairman, in response,
instructs the house management committee to leave Preobrazhensky alone. By using his
connections, Preobrazhensky is able to hold on to one of the most coveted privileges of
the 1920s: extra living space.
Over the course of the 1930s and 40s, blat became more associated with
consumption of goods that were in short supply. Rather than simply being used for
necessities, blat was now a means for obtaining more prestigious items, such as books,
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food items, clothing, makeup, or vacations. Conversations with people who lived in the
USSR at that time also reveal a great deal about the importance of blat in Soviet society.
Many of these personal accounts emphasize the near indispensability of blat connections.
As concerned citizen Petr Gatsuk pointed out in a 1940 letter to the deputy chairman of
the Council of Ministers,
Not to have blat, that’s the same thing as having no civil rights, the same as being
deprived of all rights…. Come with a request, and they will all be deaf, blind, and
dumb. If you need…to buy something in a shop—you need blat. If it’s difficult or
impossible for a passenger to get a railroad ticket, then it is simple and easy po
blatu. If you live without an apartment, don’t ever go to the housing
administration, to the procurator’s, but better to use just a little blat and you will
at once get your apartment.” (qtd. in Fitzpatrick, 1999, p. 62)
According to Gatsuk’s account, blat is not just a useful tool for obtaining sought-after
items. It is essential to everyday life in Soviet society.
Although blat was an important phenomenon in everyday Soviet life, it was not
widely acknowledged. Many people who had lived in the Soviet Union were reluctant to
talk about blat or to acknowledge their own use of it. The Harvard refugee interview
project, which surveyed over 700 refugees from the USSR in the early 1950s, reveals a
great deal about the discomfort associated with blat. Respondents in the interviews
typically distanced themselves from blat as much as possible. Those who did talk about
blat emphasized the human element of blat relations, describing the practice as a way that
friends helped one another (Russian Research Center, 1950). Thus, although the concept
of mutual assistance that is so integral to blat made it more acceptable to some, the
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phenomenon was still considered something that others did, and that was best not to
admit to oneself.
However, the Harvard project’s respondents also pointed out that some people
were much more involved in blat practices than ordinary citizens. These blat
professionals had contacts with higher persons and knew the Soviet system well enough
to manipulate it. Blat professionals knew whom to approach in order to obtain a specific
good or get a particular need taken care of. Blat experts cultivated relationships with and
had access to many more contacts than the average Soviet citizen, and were able to use
blat to a much greater extent and much more effectively (Fitzpatrick, 1999).
The Soviet film “Ty – mne, ya – tebe” provides a comedic depiction of the blat
professional in Soviet society (Seryi, 1976). The protagonist, Ivan Kashkin, is the
ultimate blat professional – although he has a job as a bath attendant, his real work is in
the establishment and use of connections to obtain sought-after goods. Kashkin
exchanges gifts with his clients at work, owns various foreign records and other luxury
items, and is able to skip long lines simply by mentioning the name of an important
official with whom he has a connection. In short, Kashkin lives by the reciprocal
principle of “ty – mne, ya – tebe” (“you to me and I to you” or “you scratch my back, I’ll
scratch yours”), which allows him to live a remarkably comfortable and luxurious life.
In the post-war period, blat merged further with the Soviet system. Ledeneva
attributes this to the appearance of tolkachi (1998). The word tolkach, which literally
translates as pusher, refers to people who were charged with expediting the production of
goods in Soviet factories. The tolkachi were responsible for ensuring that production
targets were achieved. In order to meet the necessary quotas, tolkachi had to obtain
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materials through a variety of networks, using their connections to procure goods that
would otherwise be hard to find. These practices, which were technically in violation of
the Soviet system’s rules, actually became more transparent and were accepted as part of
the institution of Soviet production. Indeed, production quotas would have been almost
impossible to fill without the use of connections, so in many ways, the Soviet system
actually encouraged blat practices.
Blat became even more prevalent and tolerated during the Brezhnev era, when it
became a more widespread method of obtaining goods that were in short supply
(Ledeneva, 1998). The growth in the use of blat can be attributed to several factors. One
reason for the growing use of blat was that consumer demands for specific goods were
changing and growing, and the inefficient planned economy was unable to compensate
for the higher levels of demand. Because of this, people turned more frequently to the
shadow economy to obtain necessary goods and services. A second reason for increased
use of blat is that citizens simply believed less and less in Soviet ideology, and were
more inclined to circumvent official channels. Thirdly, authorities became more willing
to turn a blind eye on blat practices, because they had actually become instrumental in
ensuring that the command economy could function (Ivanova, 2011).
Satirical works during the Brezhnev era, as before, played on the use of
connections to gain access to goods. In one poem, which appeared in Krokodil, the
protagonist attempts to buy cigarettes, only to find that the door to the store is locked. A
woman inside yells at him that the salesman is busy distributing shortage goods (defitsit)
to his friends. The salesman, meanwhile, protects the defitsit with his body and cries that
he is doing “a responsible deed.” The narrator concludes that he is better off, as he no
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longer goes to the store and has quit smoking. But, he says, his neighbor is not so lucky –
he has quit eating (Poluian, 1976). This poem demonstrates the combination of shame
and defiance related to using blat. It also highlights the winners and losers of blat
transactions – while the salesman’s friends are benefitting, the protagonist, and especially
his neighbor, are unable to buy necessary goods that are in shortage.
The government, for its part, did little to slow the growth in activity in the shadow
economy. Blat transactions during this period were tolerated, or even “winked at” by the
regime, in what James Millar refers to as the “Little Deal” (1985). The Little Deal was
essentially a tacit agreement between the authorities and the population that allowed the
second economy to flourish. Under the Little Deal, Soviet citizens were able to gain
access to various goods and services without any real threat of punishment by the regime.
Whereas large-scale transactions of this sort were clearly illegal and could result in
significant consequences, petty exchanges within circles of personal connections were
mostly ignored. This is most likely because blat actually eased many of the problems
associated with shortage, and the government had an interest in letting the system of
connections continue to operate (O’Hearn, 1980). Thus, blat was used to obtain such
diverse goods and services as cold cuts and other delicacies, hairdressing, tutoring,
medical services, and housekeeping. During this time, blat connections were used
extensively and obviously, suggesting that there was no real punishment for such
infractions.
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Characteristics of blat networks
Given that blat is a phenomenon that relies on connections, it is important to
understand the networks that allow it to operate. Blat networks can be broken down into
two main categories: horizontal and vertical. Horizontal networks are those that are made
up of people of similar status, while vertical networks are composed of people of
different social strata interested in each other’s connections (Ledeneva, 1998). Imagine a
horizontal network as a group of friends or family members that are all of roughly
equivalent socioeconomic status. Exchanges between members of such a network are a
regular occurrence, and there is no appearance of impropriety. Most people would agree
that it is acceptable, if not encouraged, for friends and family members to share items
with each other or perform tasks for each other in an ongoing exchange. This sort of
horizontal reciprocity is seen in almost all societies. However, it was much more
pronounced in the Soviet Union because it was one of the only methods of procuring
necessary goods and services.
Vertical networks, meanwhile, were used much less frequently. An example of a
vertical network would include a worker, or someone on a lower social stratum, and a
party boss, who has access to various goods and services that others do not. The
connection between these two actors becomes essential to the worker, and the party boss
may provide him with various favors that others do not have access to. All of these favors
are given, however, with the expectation of an exchange, and the worker will eventually
need to reciprocate by helping the party boss in whatever way he can. It is the use of
these vertical networks, rather than horizontal ones, that accounts for much of the
negative association with blat. The main difference between these two types of blat
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relations is that while horizontal networks were used on a regular basis, vertical networks
were used less often. Furthermore, blat ties among family and friends (horizontal) were
more commonly accepted, whereas the use of connections for profit or explicit exchange
(vertical) was often looked upon with resentment, because they were seen as unethical
and less personal than horizontal exchanges.
It should be noted that, although similar in many respects, blat is not the same
thing as bribery. While the two phenomena certainly overlap, blat differs from bribery in
the sense that there is always a personal basis for the exchange. Bribery also implies
immediate payment, whereas reciprocation in a blat transaction can take time and occur
in various forms (Berliner, 1957). The line, however, between bribery and blat, can
sometimes be difficult to make out. One case that demonstrates the ambiguity of the
distinction is that of Yuri Sokolov, the director of the Eliseevsky Gastronom in Moscow
(Faitelberg, 2004).
During the Brezhnev period, the Eliseevsky Gastronom was known as the best
grocery store for buying items that were almost impossible to find elsewhere. Because of
this, many members of high society, including diplomats, generals, and actors, attempted
to cultivate a relationship with the director of the store, Yuri Sokolov. In exchange for
access to the store’s shortage items, these high-powered people were able to offer
Sokolov various services. For example, Sokolov’s friendship with the Minister of Internal
Affairs, Nikolai Shchelokov, allowed him to avoid problems with law enforcement. The
actors, artists, and musicians, meanwhile, gave Sokolov access to tickets for various
shows, and even performed an annual concert at the store itself. These were all classic
examples of blat exchanges – continuous interactions based on friendship.
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However, in order to obtain those coveted goods that made his store so attractive,
Sokolov needed money. Therefore, in addition to various favors, Sokolov also took
bribes, which he then passed on to members of the Gortorg, which determined the
allocation of goods for grocery stores. By bribing these officials, Sokolov was able to
guarantee access to luxury grocery items, and therefore able to hold up his end of the
relationships he had cultivated with Moscow high society. In the case of the Eliseevsky
Gastronom, blat and bribery were intimately interconnected.
Despite the hazy distinction between blat and bribery that can appear in practice,
however, the two phenomena can be distinguished from one another in theory. Blat
consists of multiple favors given over time within personal networks; a bribe, by contrast,
is a specific, immediate deal outside of those networks (Humphrey, 2002). Thus, this
paper is not simply an investigation of bribery or corruption, but of a specific cultural
phenomenon that occurs based on personal relationships.
These personal relationships were fundamental to the day-to-day working of
Soviet society. They created a sort of social capital, a currency in which practically
everyone had something they could share with others, with the expectation of eventual
reciprocation (Utekhin, 2007). Although blat went against the Soviet social and economic
order, the system could not have functioned without it. Blat became the primary way of
getting things done in a non-market society in which money had little value. The
relationship between the Soviet system and blat had two sides to it. On the one hand, the
conditions created by a command economy made blat necessary and allowed it to
operate. On the other hand, the structure of the system and the rules enforced by Soviet
authorities limited blat practices to small-scale transactions, and kept the entire
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phenomenon of blat from spiraling out of control. Once the Soviet system disappeared,
however, the nature of blat changed dramatically.

II. Blat and the transition to a market economy
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, as Russia was transformed from a command
economy into a market economy, blat played a crucial role in the way the business
environment developed. For many entrepreneurs during this period, one’s connections
were the main determinant of whether or not one was to succeed in business. The use of
blat during the transition to a market economy created a small group of insiders that
succeeded in business, while the vast majority of those who lacked connections were less
successful. A brief history of the process of privatization and the transition to a capitalist
economy will explain how blat contributed to the creation of an insider/outsider dynamic
– a dynamic that still exists in the Russian market today.
Beginning in 1987, as part of Gorbachev’s attempt to reform the Soviet system,
the state allowed new autonomous businesses, known as “cooperatives,” to form. The
cooperative movement was initially limited to small sections of the economy, but by the
time the Law on Cooperatives was adopted in 1988, many of these quasi-private
businesses had already formed. As the movement took hold, it became clear that success
depended on knowing the right people. Connections were important in establishing a
cooperative for several reasons. First, one could not simply start a cooperative; it was
necessary to obtain permission from the government. Not surprisingly, many of those
who received permission to start cooperatives in the early years were already well
connected with those in power.
Second, many goods remained difficult to find during the transition, and
connections were essential for obtaining the necessary supplies to operate a business.
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Despite the fact that cooperatives represented a significant step away from the planned
economy, they were still operating in an environment of scarcity. Thus, only those who
had connections to suppliers could truly benefit from the opportunities of the cooperative
movement. As journalist David E. Hoffman points out in his book on the transition, “the
first private entrepreneurs had to rely on their wits—on blat and svyazi, on theft, bribes
and bargaining—to get supplies” (2002, p. 42).
Third, ties to the government allowed many cooperatives to acquire the necessary
liquidity to develop their business, especially as many cooperatives attempted to enter the
banking industry. This is because most banks would have been unable to survive without
cheap credit from the state. Indeed, “big industries, regional governments, and the
Communist Party and its many affiliates were the driving force in the explosion of the
new banking sector, and their political clout and money dwarfed the more independent
young cooperatives” (Hoffman, 2002, p. 46). Thus, those entrepreneurs who had
connections to state resources were much better positioned to establish successful,
lucrative banking operations.
One of those who benefitted hugely from this system was Mikhail Khodorkovsky,
a young Komsomol member who went on to become the richest man in Russia. Over a
very short period of time, Khodorkovsky was able to make huge amounts of money
through various business operations, eventually establishing Bank Menatep and acquiring
the oil company Yukos. His success was in large part thanks to his various connections
and friendships, and to his affiliation with the Komsomol, which provided him with
legitimacy and access (Hoffman, 2002). As Khodorkovsky himself acknowledged, “All
the ventures that were started at this time succeeded only if they were sponsored by or
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had strong connections with high-ranking people. It wasn’t the money but the patronage.
At the time, you had to have political sponsorship” (Khodorkovsky qtd. in Hoffman,
2002, p. 101). And Khodorkovsky was not alone. In fact, his is just one example of “a
movement that would gain momentum as the Soviet Union fell apart: party, government,
militia, and KGB officials on all levels went into business, using their contacts as starting
capital” (Brady, 1999, p. 56). In many cases, these contacts were the determinant of
success.
Another entrepreneur who took advantage of his connections in order to succeed
in business was Vladimir Gusinsky, the former media magnate. Like Khodorkovsky,
Gusinsky recognized the importance of friendships and connections with people in high
places. Regardless of one’s personal feelings toward a particular official, it was essential
to develop good relations with anyone who could be of use. Even more important,
Gusinsky believed, was to offer that official something that he needed to advance his own
career: “So it was always important for me to understand, what does this boss need?”
(Gusinsky qtd. in Hoffman, 2002, p. 160). Gusinsky’s observations demonstrate how blat
had become a system that allowed officials and businessmen to pursue their own selfinterest under a veneer of friendly relations.
Blat also proved instrumental in determining who would control those businesses
that already existed prior to the collapse. In many cases, those who already knew the ins
and outs of the business and had established connections in the industry were able to
retain control in the face of market reforms. Newcomers, even with an education in
business and free markets, were at a disadvantage. This was particularly apparent in the
battle for the position of general director of the Vladimir Tractor Factory. The Factory,
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which was the main employer in the town of Vladimir, had made tractors and diesel
engines since 1945. In the face of Yeltsin’s reforms, the question emerged of who would
take control of the factory when the state sold its shares.
On one side was the factory’s general director, Anatoly Grishin. Grishin was well
versed in the central planning system, and knew how to succeed within it. He had
mastered the art of using personal ties and “managing within the old boys’ network”
(Brady, 1999, p. 82). He had close relationships with customers as well as suppliers, and
also maintained contacts within government. However, Grishin was challenged for
ownership by Josef Bakaleynik, the deputy director of the factory. Bakaleynik was the
quintessential new Russian businessman with a passion for markets, having even studied
at Harvard Business School through a scholarship program for Soviet managers.
In order to gain control of the factory, one of the men would have to gain control
of the shares, which meant winning over the shareholders, mainly factory workers.
Bakaleynik attempted to do this by offering the shareholders a dividend, but Grishin was
able to gain far more support by having his foremen ask workers to hand over their voting
rights to worker representatives (Brady, 1999). At the shareholders meeting, Bakaleynik
attempted to appeal to market values and the new business environment, but received
little support. One worker declared, “I think a Harvard education will not help you.
Today you need personal contacts, deep personal contacts” (Brady, 1999, p. 89). Another
worker expressed his confidence in Grishin based on the length of their relationship,
declaring, “I trust him because I know him for eighteen years” (Brady, 1999, p. 91). The
reactions of the workers demonstrated that even in the transition, business knowledge
was secondary to connections. This was made clear in the voting as well, which Grishin
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won by a whopping 82 percent. When it came to knowing the right people, Grishin
clearly came out ahead, and was thus able to retain control of the factory through the
reforms.
As the transition from the command economy to the market economy moved
forward, connections with those in power continued to be an important determinant of
who succeeded in Russian business. As part of the effort to privatize state-owned assets,
the state held so-called “loans-for-shares” auctions. These auctions, which were part of
the post-voucher “cash phase” of privatization, were intended to help the government
finance the federal budget deficit. Under the program, the government offered shares in
major companies as collateral for loans from large banks. Given the government's
deplorable financial situation, the program practically guaranteed the banks a stake in the
companies in question. The ability to participate in the program was therefore crucial, as
it was a stepping stone to ownership in large state companies. However, participation in
the loans-for-shares auctions was limited to a small number of banks. The new owners of
the former state companies were selected not by market forces, but by politicians
(Hoffman, 2002). Indeed, all the banks that were allowed to participate in the auctions
had close ties to political power brokers (Colloudon, 1998). Thus, it was important to
have friends in high places, and to use those connections for a chance to participate in the
loans-for-shares auctions.
One case in which connections to the government proved particularly lucrative
was in the auction for Norilsk Nickel in 1995. In November of that year, an auction was
held for control of 38% of Norilsk Nickel, which was the world's largest producer of
nickel, platinum, and cobalt. Uneximbank, the firm that was ultimately victorious in the
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auction, had close ties to President Yeltsin's former security chief and drinking buddy,
Alexander Karzhakov. This connection gave the firm a distinct advantage, especially
since Uneximbank itself was charged with managing the auction. In this role,
Uneximbank was able to award itself control of Norilsk Nickel at a laughably low price –
only half that offered by a competitor. Furthermore, with a price tag of $170 million, the
shares of Norilsk Nickel were sold at only $100,000 above the minimum bid level,
which, not surprisingly, was set by Uneximbank (Frydman et al, 1998). Thus,
Uneximbank was able to capitalize on its connections within the government to gain the
position of auctioneer, thereby ensuring that the firm would be able to buy the shares of
Norilsk Nickel at a cut-rate price.
The importance of connections in establishing a cooperative or participating in the
loans-for-shares auctions ensured that only a small group of people would significantly
profit from the process of privatization. As a result of the reforms of this period, a closeknit, clannish economic elite formed in Russia. By the the mid-1990s, it had become
clear that privatization in Russia was not the domain of self-made entrepreneurs, but
instead of the politically and economically well-connected (Karklins, 2005). Olga
Kryshtanovskaya, a Russian sociologist, was one of the first to take note of and study the
emerging clan structure of what she called “the financial oligarchy” (qtd. in Hoffman,
2002). The group she observed, generally referred to simply as “the oligarchs”, formed a
network of connections that married the interests of wealth and power. Glenn Waller, an
Australian diplomat who was in Russia at the time, called the relationship between
business and government “incestuous”, claiming that even the new business elite was a
product of the old Soviet system:
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Most (if not all) of the private financial groups made their first capital through
their privileged access to party and Komsomol funds or through political contacts
(in Russian: blat) in government ministries. Today, they continue to rely on
government favors…. Big Business in Russia continues to coalesce around
powerful political leaders. (Waller qtd. in Hoffman, 2002, p. 322)
As Waller notes, the blat connections between political leaders and businesspeople in
Russia determined who was part of the elite group of oligarchs, and thus, who succeeded
in business. Indeed, “each oligarch needed to cultivate a good relationship with a senior
government official or his relatives. Intrigue, connections and payoffs count for more
than talent” (Goldman, 2003, p. 154). Without such connections, a newcomer to Russain
business would be at a severe disadvantage. This dynamic of insiders and outsiders would
continue to determine the course of the Russian economy for years after the end of
privatization.
It is clear that blat played a significant role in the formation of the Russian market
economy in the post-Soviet era. It is true that blat was in many ways a tool for coping
with the rigidities of the Soviet command economy. However, it appears that the
phenomenon was so “deeply embedded in social relations, including kinship,
neighborhood, ethnicity, and common religion,” that it continued to shape market
interactions throughout the post-Soviet transition (Humphrey, 2002, p. 138). This is not
to say that the nature of blat did not change during this time period – it was certainly
adapted and molded to fit the needs of the new economy and the new actors on the postSoviet stage. However, the essence of the phenomenon remained the same: the use of
personal connections to obtain hard-to-find goods and services.

III. Blat lived, lives, and will live: The use of connections in modern Russia
The collapse of the Soviet Union meant the end of many of the conditions that
made blat necessary, and the process of transition to a market economy certainly
transformed the phenomenon. But does this mean that blat has disappeared entirely? Or
has it simply evolved in the context of the post-Soviet economy?
The word “blat” itself is still in use, although a generational gap seems to have
developed in terms of its understanding. Whereas older generations associate the term
“blat” with the use of connections, younger generations associate it more with its
original, pre-Soviet meaning, which refers to petty criminal activity. Although this
generational difference indicates that the term has lost its central significance, it does not
mean that blat no longer exists. Indeed, Ledeneva argues that blat has assumed new
forms that go beyond the areas in which the term was traditionally used (1998). Thus,
although blat has changed, and may no longer be consistently referred to by the same
name, it should be analyzed as a continuous – though evolving – phenomenon.
In her most recent analysis of blat in the post-Soviet environment, Ledeneva
explains the changes that the phenomenon has undergone in the past two decades. First,
blat has become monetized. This is because, in general, goods are now widely available.
Money, on the other hand, is in short supply. Whereas blat was once a means of
obtaining goods and services in a society in which money had little value, it is now used
to obtain the money itself (Ledeneva, 1998). The driving force behind blat connections
has therefore been reoriented toward obtaining money. The scale of blat exchange has
also changed. Blat is now used for a wider variety of needs in the newly formed private
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sector, such as establishing a personal business or rerouting state funds into the private
sector. However, the number of people to whom blat is available as a means of
transaction has shrunk. Blat in the Soviet system was available to virtually everyone as a
method of obtaining necessary goods. Now, however, blat is only available to a select
few in the business sphere. Therefore, blat practices are larger in scale, but less pervasive,
primarily serving the needs of the business sector (Ledeneva, 2008).
Given the new importance of blat in the business sector, this area deserves special
attention. The use of blat is often cited as one of the reasons for the corruption that
continues to afflict Russian business. In business, blat is used to access bureaucratic
decision-making and information, connections that can in turn result in increased
monetary income. In fact, many now consider business to be one of the realms in which
blat remains most useful today (Puffer & McCarthy, 2011). Part of the continued use of
blat can be explained by history – the use of personal connections has become deeply
embedded in Russian culture. However, there is also a practical explanation for the
phenomenon’s continued importance. The Russian business environment is characterized
by an inadequate legal system that fails to guarantee businesses protection through any
formal needs. Therefore, the formation of close personal relationships and informal
networks is used to replace the formal protections that are present in more developed
business environments (Butler & Purchase, 2004; Kuznetsov & Kuznetsova, 2005). As in
Soviet times, blat serves as grease for a machine that might not otherwise function,
supplementing for the system’s deficiencies and failures.
As a response to these shortcomings, businesspeople in Russia have resorted to a
particular form of blat adapted for the market economy. Like in Soviet blat networks, the

30

connections in Russian business are based on personal contacts in what is referred to as
“network capitalism” (Puffer & McCarthy, 2007; Hunter, 2003). Despite its impersonal
name, network capitalism is a system in which “virtually all important business alliances
are embedded in personal ties between business people who know and trust one another”
(Hunter, 2003, p. 115). Thus, network capitalism is simply a different name for a more
modern manifestation of blat – one that has adapted to the needs of Russian
businesspeople in the market economy.
The use of network capitalism as a business tool is widespread in post-Soviet
Russia. In a survey conducted in the late 1990s, Russian managers ranked connections as
one of the two most important factors for success in business1 (Taylor & Kazakov, 1997).
In another study of twenty-two Russian domestic firms, fifteen firms attested to using
connections to do business, and nine of those firms specifically used the term blat to
describe their business practices (Hunter, 2003). Furthermore, network capitalism has
been shown to be an effective tool for those firms and businesspeople who use it. In a
study based on interviews with seventy-five Russian entrepreneurs, political scientist Bat
Batjargal (2003) found that personal network ties directly improve entrepreneurial
performance. This is because, according to Batjargal, “having many weak ties and being
able to mobilize financial resources from rich and powerful contacts enables
entrepreneurs to increase their revenues and profits” (p. 551). Network capitalism, then,
is both a widely used and effective tool in Russian business.
For businesses in contemporary Russia, network capitalism, or blat, is especially
necessary in relation to tax authorities, customs officers, the banking sector, and regional
1

The other most important factor that the surveyed managers listed was dishonesty.
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administration (Michailova & Worm, 2003). Blat is a helpful tool for businesses looking
to gain preferential bank financing, export licenses, tax exemptions, special terms in
contracts, or access to influential customers (Butler & Purchase, 2004; Ledeneva, 2008).
In order to establish a business and keep it running, “entrepreneurs must routinely offer
favors to public officials, ranging from local police and fire authorities to politicians in
local and federal governments” (Puffer et al., 2010, p. 448). Interestingly, the use of blat
connections both substitutes and complements the use of money when dealing with
officials. Connections allow certain businesspeople within a network to obtain a good or
service for which others would have to pay a bribe, or at least reduces the amount of the
bribe that is required (Gehlbach, 2001).
As in the Soviet era, the use of blat is reflected in contemporary literature. In
Oksana Robski’s novel Casual, the main character is attempting to start a buttermilk
business. The protagonist explains the plight of looking for someone to sell her product:
“Now I had to find a network of dealers. If I talked to Wimm-Bill-Dann, the biggest
packagers of juices in Russia, they would start selling buttermilk themselves. I had to talk
to a friend, who would be bound by his word” (Robski, 2006, p. 63). The importance of
obligation in blat connections is key here. The narrator feels that she cannot trust anyone
with whom she would communicate through official channels, and therefore seeks out
someone on whom she can rely on a personal basis, and who feels compelled to help her.
The connections that businesspeople like Robski’s character use can be longstanding, but some blat connections have been formed more recently. The success of the
new economic elite “is often built on networks of access to goods, information and
contacts either dating back to their professional position in Soviet times or due to their
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‘family background’” (Bruno, 1997, p. 57). Indeed, connections formed under the Soviet
system remain prevalent in modern Russian business. However, newly founded
enterprises are building new networks of their own (Huber & Wörgötter, 1998). Thus, it
would seem that the use of blat in business is not simply a holdover from the command
economy, but a phenomenon that is continuing to perpetuate itself in market conditions as
well.
Although blat has continued to be a useful business tool for those who are part of
a network, it disadvantages those who are outside of the web of connections. As pointed
out earlier, blat connections reduce the costs of dealing with officials by substituting for,
or at least complementing bribery. However, those entrepreneurs outside the network
face higher costs than they would in the absence of a network, because without
connections, they are forced to pay the full bribe (Gehlbach, 2001). Thus, blat networks
decrease costs for members of the in-group, who are able to circumvent the need to pay
bribes. Those same networks, on the other hand, increase costs for those who are
outsiders, and must pay for necessary favors from officials.
This theory of blat networks is corroborated by evidence indicating that the
Russian business environment favors insiders. In an analysis of Russian entrepreneurship,
Aidis et al. (2008) found that entrepreneurs who are already in the business sector
dominate entrepreneurial entry in Russia more than in other countries. The entrepreneurs’
connections in the business sector were most likely key in creating this advantage, and in
discouraging entry of new business actors. Thus, network capitalism, or business blat, is
a system that favors insiders, with little opportunity for entry by newcomers to the
business sector.

IV. Strangers in a Strange Land: How blat affects foreign businesspeople
It is widely agreed that Russia is not an easy market for foreign companies to
enter. Indeed, Russia places 120th out of 183 countries on the World Bank’s ease of doing
business rankings, receiving a worse rating than countries such as Yemen, Pakistan, and
Kosovo (World Bank, 2012). It is also no secret that corruption in the country is rampant,
and Russia ranks 143rd out of 182 countries on Transparency International’s Corruption
Perceptions Index (Transparency International, 2011). Given that international
perceptions of the Russian business environment are so poor, it is not surprising that
levels of Foreign Direct Investment in the country have remained relatively low. In the
period from 1992 to 2010, the average foreign direct investment as a percentage of GDP
was only 1.7%. China’s, meanwhile, was over 4% (World Bank, 2011). While it is
impossible to determine to what extent, blat and similar practices undoubtedly contribute
significantly to these abysmally low rankings and investment figures. As already
discussed, blat is still a very important reality of the business environment in Russia. But
what specific effect does the phenomenon have on foreign companies trying to do
business in Russia? Do foreigners encounter blat in their dealings with Russians, and if
so, how does it affect their own business success?
Given that Russia has only been a part of the global marketplace for about twenty
years, it can be difficult to draw lasting conclusions about the various difficulties and
advantages of foreign investment in the country. This is especially true with respect to the
challenges posed to a foreign investor by blat, since the phenomenon itself is not well
documented. However, by piecing together various observations made over the past
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twenty years regarding foreign companies doing business in Russia, we can better
understand the nature of blat’s effects on foreign investors.
The first question that arises with respect to blat and foreign companies is
whether the phenomenon is relevant to non-Russian businesses at all. Blat is, after all, a
uniquely Soviet (and now Russian) concept, and it seems to only occur within established
networks. However, blat networks do not exist in a vacuum. In fact, foreign companies
will often encounter blat networks, and many times have no choice but to deal with them.
In their overview of the differences in business ethics between Russians and Americans,
Sheila Puffer and Daniel McCarthy note that American businesspeople are likely to
encounter blat quite often in Russia. In fact, they claim blat is “the most frequently
encountered questionable behavior in Russia” (Puffer & McCarthy, 1995). Thus, blat is
not just a nebulous, outdated Soviet concept, but a modern reality that foreign
businesspeople continue to encounter. But the question remains: how exactly does blat
affect the experiences of foreign companies in the Russian market?
In some cases, when used effectively, blat practices can actually provide foreign
firms with certain advantages when entering the Russian market. Indeed, networking
capabilities and the use of connections have played a major role in determining foreign
firms’ effectiveness. A survey of 179 foreign firms operating in Russia, for example,
found that adaptability to network conditions and involvement within networks were the
most important determinants of effectiveness in the Russian market (Fey & Denison,
2003). Another study of West European companies investing in Russia found that it was
very important to have a partner with political influence, especially in the context of
Russia’s fluid legal environment. Having such a partner was particularly helpful for
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obtaining approval to set up a new office, or in registration, custodial, and settlement
procedures (Ariño et al., 1997). It is clear then, that adapting to networks and using
connections to one’s advantage can help foreign firms in their entry into the Russian
market. However, the blat system has many drawbacks for foreign entrants as well –
hindrances that often outweigh the advantage that the system can provide.
One way in which blat has proven difficult for foreigners is that it is simply very
different from business practices in other countries. With the possible exception of
Chinese guanxi2, there are no real analogues to blat in other cultures. Although it may be
tempting to compare blat to the networking that is often used in the West, the two
phenomena are actually quite different. Personal networking in the West is based
primarily on individualism and is characterized by non-personal exchanges that are
discrete in time and take place outside the workplace. Blat, on the other hand, is based on
collectivism, and is characterized by highly frequent exchanges that are usually personal,
but also take place at the workplace (Michailova & Worm, 2003). Because of these
differences, Western businesspeople will not be predisposed to understanding how blat
networks function.
Foreign investors are likely to have a difficult time navigating the peculiarities of
a business environment in which an unfamiliar concept plays such a large role. Scholars
have cited a noticeable variance between Russian national business culture and
international business culture as a challenge and deterrent to foreign firms doing business

2

Guanxi involves “the exchange of gifts, favors, and banquets; the cultivation of personal relationships and
networks of mutual dependence; and the creation of obligation and indebtedness” (Ledeneva, 2008). The
many differences between blat and guanxi are not within the purview of this paper, but it is important to
recognize that, although the two phenomena are often compared, they are not the same.
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in Russia (Kuznetsov & Kuznetsova, 2005). Undoubtedly, blat plays a role in this
variance, widening the gap in business practices between Russia and the rest of the world.
Specifically, foreign investors may encounter blurred boundaries between formal
and informal spheres when engaging in business. This stands in sharp contrast to
practices in the West, where business relationships are generally impersonal, and
business interactions take place in a formal setting (Jansson et al., 2007). This difference
can often be a source of confusion for Western investors in Russia. The importance of the
personal dimension of Russian business relationships means that foreign investors may
need to spend a good deal of time on relationships with Russian business partners. Often
this means getting to know each other’s families, drinking vodka, or going on hunting
trips. This, of course, would be unfamiliar territory for Western businesspeople, who are
accustomed to formal negotiations and straightforward agreements (Brady, 1999).
Indeed, Westerners often underestimate the amount of time and effort necessary to build
a relationship and secure an initial agreement with a Russian business partner (Barnes et
al., 1997).
A second obstacle that foreigners will likely encounter is that blat is, by its very
nature, an exclusive arrangement. No matter how hard a foreign businessperson tries to
understand and engage in blat, the system will favor insiders. We have already discussed
how, during the transition from a command economy to a market economy, blat
connections created a clear dichotomy between insiders and outsiders. Those with ties to
government and friends in high places were much better positioned to succeed in the new
Russia than those who were less well connected. Connections to people in power were
then, and remain now, an essential part of doing business in Russia.
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Because of the strong ties between businesses and the state, the Russian economy
still provides greater opportunities to so-called “entrepreneurial insiders” than to less
connected newcomers to the market (Aidis, 2007). Furthermore, connections continue to
play an important role long after a business is established. This is partially to facilitate the
process of getting supplies or finding customers. But it is also indicative of a larger
cultural mistrust of outsiders, which leads to a lack of transparency and a dependency on
networks (Puffer & McCarthy, 2011). It is not difficult to see then, how a system that so
favors insiders would be especially difficult for a foreign investor to navigate. Indeed,
Russian networks “are closed and opaque to outsider firms” (Jansson et al., 2007). A
foreign businessperson will be unlikely to know the necessary authorities in Russian
government, and even less likely to be able to trust them to the extent a well-connected
Russian businessperson could. Foreign businesspeople, as outsiders, are thus limited in
their ability to participate in the system of exchange and blat relations (Bruno, 1997).
Language and cultural barriers aside, the system of blat is a closed-off one, and even the
most well-financed, talented foreign businesspeople will have difficulty penetrating it.
But there is a third problem associated with blat, one that foreigners are unlikely
to overcome, even with considerable time and effort. Specifically, foreign firms will face
the challenge of operating under international ethical standards, which often don’t
correspond with Russian business practices. Blat itself is not technically illegal. But blat
networks are often used for questionable practices from which many foreign companies
would shrink. Since blat often involves using connections with state authorities to benefit
one’s business, it can easily run afoul of foreigners’ concept of ethical business practices
(Puffer and McCarthy, 1995). Indeed, practices that are legal in Russia may still cause
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problems for foreign companies because they face legal sanctions from their home
country.3 This can discourage multinationals from engaging in any practice that could be
seen as corruptive, since they risk facing significant legal consequences at home (Venard,
2009). Even setting these legal issues aside, most foreign companies are held to account
by consumers in countries with a different understanding of business ethics than that
found in Russia. What may be looked upon as an everyday business practice in Russia
could be seen as bribery by observers abroad. Therefore, foreign companies are put in the
awkward position of trying to integrate themselves into a system of practices that would
not necessarily be considered ethical by their consumers.
In sum, I propose that blat disadvantages foreign businesses in Russia in three
distinct ways. (1) It is unique to Russian culture and difficult for non-Russian
businesspeople to understand. Because there is no analogue to blat in other countries’
business cultures, foreign businesspeople have difficulty learning how to navigate the
system. (2) Blat is, by nature, a system that favors insiders. Having longstanding
connections with the right people is key, and foreign companies, as the ultimate outsiders,
are at a significant disadvantage. (3) The practices associated with blat are sometimes of
questionable ethical nature to outside observers, and even foreign firms that are able to
integrate themselves effectively into the Russian market may face pressure from
consumers or legal sanctions from their own governments for engaging in blat practices.

3

The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, for example, prohibits the bribery of foreign government officials by
U.S. persons. (U.S. Department of Justice, 1998)
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The case of IKEA
In order to assess this theory of how blat affects multinational companies
operating in Russia, it is useful to examine the experience of the Swedish furniture
retailer IKEA in entering the Russian market. I have chosen IKEA because it is one of the
few Western multinationals whose experiences in Russia have been well documented.
Thus, using this company’s experience as a qualitative case study gives us the most
information with which to test the hypothesis above about blat’s effect on foreign firms.
IKEA opened its first Russian store in Moscow in 2000, and now has fourteen
stores in eleven Russian cities (“Richer Russians,” 2012). Russia quickly became a very
important market for the company, accounting for 5 percent of their business worldwide.
Prior to the economic crisis, IKEA’s business in Russia was growing 20 percent per year
(Kramer, 2009b). The company has repeatedly cited Russia as a key market, with
significant business potential in retailing, purchasing, and production (IKEA Group,
2010). However, the company has also encountered various obstacles in Russia. This
section will explore the business practices that allowed IKEA to succeed in Russia, the
difficulties that have plagued the company more recently, and the role of blat practices in
determining the nature of the company’s experience in the Russian market.
One reason that IKEA was able to achieve relatively rapid growth and success in
Russia was its effective use of connections when initially entering the market. As with
many firms, blat seems to have helped IKEA deal with the challenges of the Russian
market. In their study of IKEA’s entry into the Russian market, Elg, Ghauri, and
Tarnovskaya (2008) found that the company was successful because of its use of network
capitalism and its cultivation of close personal relationships with key people. IKEA made
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a concerted effort to build trust with network insiders. By building this trust and
becoming part of the network, IKEA became less of an outsider. Indeed, building trust
with network insiders was critical, as it facilitated “the growth of the network and the
development of business contacts to those network actors who are in control of critical
activities and resources” (Elg et al., 2008, p. 689). As the trust between IKEA staff and
their Russian contacts grew, both parties became more open in sharing information.
IKEA, then, was itself able to become somewhat of an insider, which in turn gave it a
competitive advantage in relation to other retailers, who had not cultivated the same type
of personal relationships.
Networking activities were critical because contacts with officials aided IKEA in
acquiring necessary permissions and land or managing construction of their large store
complexes. IKEA made an effort to establish personal contacts with authorities at all
levels of government, as well as with suppliers, journalists, and other influential actors.
IKEA’s initial success was facilitated by the fact that the company worked on
establishing supplier relationships well in advance of opening stores in the country. A
close personal rapport with key Russian actors was essential. Even the highest levels of
management and government were involved: IKEA’s founder, Ingvar Kamprad, met
personally with President Putin to discuss Russian customs rules and IKEA’s plans for
future investment (Elg et al., 2008).
These relationships ensured that IKEA would have an established business
network in Russia. They also helped provide IKEA with a preliminary understanding of
the culture and the consumers it would be dealing with. In general, “the exchange of
mutual benefits and relationships with political and social actors also gave IKEA
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representatives an increasing understanding of the culture as well as of how the
bureaucratic system worked” (Elg et al., 2008, p. 690). Thus, the connections that IKEA
made early on in the establishment of its Russian venture helped make the company more
fluent in the language of blat, giving its executives a better understanding of how Russian
networks functioned. It also guaranteed that the company had friends in powerful
positions. These relationships, both by teaching IKEA managers about blat and by
providing the benefits associated with network capitalism, proved instrumental in
ensuring that IKEA’s entry into the Russian market was a success.
IKEA also brought its own creative business approach to its operations in Russia,
which helped the company overcome some of the problems it encountered. Although
IKEA had made a concerted effort to cultivate good relationships and blat connections
with Russian officials, it also wanted to ensure that it would not be completely dependent
on them. This often meant resorting to new and creative methods of ensuring the
company’s independence and ability to operate. For example, when officials cut off the
electricity supply prior to the opening of one of IKEA’s Moscow stores, IKEA brought in
generators to ensure that the store could operate as planned. In fact, after this incident, the
company made it a general practice to have a generator in every one of its Russian stores
(Loshak, 2010). Thus, while IKEA attempted to use connections and networks to its
advantage, it also recognized the unreliability of Russian officials and the necessity of
creating an independent contingency plan.
It seems, then, that IKEA was able to overcome many of the obstacles of blat,
first by working to gain a better understanding of the system, then by further building
trust and becoming an insider in the exclusive blat networks. Indeed, Elg et al. argue that
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it was these very activities that determined IKEA’s success in entering the Russian
market (2008). Furthermore, IKEA endeavored to guard itself against the uncertainty of
the Russian market by attempting to maintain a certain level of independence. In addition
to cultivating close relationships with officials, IKEA took measures to ensure that it
could continue to operate even without the support of local officials. This strategy, which
was a creative and unique combination of the use of business networks and the
maintenance of relative independence, contributed to IKEA’s initial success in the
Russian market.
More recent evidence, however, would suggest that not all is well. IKEA has run
into several difficulties that have led it to reevaluate its approach to the Russian market.
One case that proved particularly frustrating to IKEA executives was the opening of a
store in Samara. Despite years of preparation and consultation with local officials, the
opening of IKEA’s new store in Samara was postponed nine times. The most recent
reason that Russian officials cited for delaying the opening was that the building for the
store was not adequately built to withstand hurricanes – a prospect that seems rather
unlikely in the Volga region (Loshak, 2010). Frustrated, IKEA announced a halting of
investment in Russia “due to the unpredictability of the administrative processes in some
regions” (Toohey, 2011). Outside observers have interpreted this statement as code for
IKEA’s exasperation with the rampant corruption in Russia (Kramer, 2009a). The
Samara store only opened in September 2011 after a four-year delay, undoubtedly costing
IKEA millions of dollars in lost revenue.
The Samara case closely resembles an earlier incident in Nizhnii Novgorod. In
2006, an IKEA store in Nizhnii Novgorod was forced to close for a period of thirty days
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when authorities determined the store did not comply fully with fire safety regulations.
The forced closure, which occurred just before the holiday season, was estimated to have
cost the company up to 50 million dollars (Miliaev, Chichurina, Savel'ev & Morozova,
2006). In both of these cases, it is reasonable to assume that the delays and closures were
not based on actual safety concerns, but instead on an attempt to extort money from the
company in exchange for permission to operate the stores. These incidents persuasively
demonstrate that even the most creative business practices are subject to setbacks due to
corruption. Despite IKEA’s concerted effort at establishing useful connections while
simultaneously maintaining a significant degree of independence, it was still subject to
the whims of local authorities. Had IKEA been able to establish more reliable blat
connections with the authorities in question, they might not have experienced such delays
and difficulties.
IKEA has also run into problems with executives within its own ranks. In 2010,
IKEA founder Ingvar Kamprad learned that a Russian executive at IKEA was reportedly
taking kickbacks from the company that provided IKEA with its prized generators. In
exchange, the executive convinced top IKEA leadership to overpay for the use of the
generators. As a result, IKEA had overpaid by about 200 million dollars. Adding insult to
injury, IKEA terminated the contract with the generator company, only to be slapped
with a five million euro fine by Russian courts for breaking the terms of the contract
(Loshak, 2010). In December 2011, Russian authorities accused another IKEA manager
of attempting to extort a bribe from a local businessman who wanted to rent space at one
of the company’s Moscow shopping centers (Mauldin, 2011).
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In February of 2010, IKEA fired the director of its operations in Central and
Eastern Europe, Per Kaufman, and the director of its operations in Russia, Stefan Gross.
The two executives were fired for giving bribes to an energy company in St. Petersburg,
in order to ensure that the IKEA store there would have power. At the time, Russian
newspapers seemed puzzled by the firings – after all, the officials were giving bribes to
advance the interests of their company, not taking them for their own self-interest
(Taranov, 2010). This attitude demonstrates the difference in approach to ethics in the
two countries. Whereas American business ethics would condemn bribery as
unequivocally corrupt, the Russian mindset sees it as an acceptable – and perhaps
necessary – measure to ensure a company's survival.
Regardless of what Russian standards might dictate when it comes to business
ethics, this pattern of corruption is particularly damning for IKEA. The company has
spoken out forcefully against corruption in the past. In a statement on its website, the
company emphasizes that it “works proactively to prevent corruption and illegal ctivities
and disassociates itself from corruption in any form, whether direct or indirect” (IKEA
Group, 2011). Indeed, from the very beginning of its entry into the Russian market, IKEA
made it clear that it intended to follow its own rules and ethical principles (Loshak,
2010), and the company has been one of the most outspoken Western corporate critics of
Russian corruption since opening its first store in the country in 2000 (Kramer, 2009b).
IKEA’s 2009 decision to halt investment also indicates the extent of the
corruption problem in Russia, given that IKEA runs many international outlets and is
“hardly thin-skinned when it comes to dealing with bureaucracies” (Kramer, 2009a). The
problem, most likely, lies in the incompatibility of IKEA’s corporate values and the

45

measures that are often necessary to run a successful business in Russia. Even though
IKEA was able to adjust to the Russian market and make the necessary connections there,
it is still held to the standards of Western businesses, and is therefore unable to justify
corrupt business tactics. Although blat does not necessarily entail bribery or extortion, it
can facilitate it. It appears that IKEA managers in Russia had difficulty toeing the line
between cultivating useful business connections and engaging in corruption. The
accusations and admissions of corruption indicate that IKEA’s market entry strategy of
using blat connections may have backfired as they are forced to face international ethics
standards.
Indeed, IKEA executives appear to have been caught off guard by the problems
that the Russia branch of the company encountered. The founder of the company, Ingvar
Kamprad, expressed his dismay in a 2010 press release: “The documented general
disorder inside our Russian shopping center company is totally unacceptable. I have been
over-optimistic. It is shocking and sad that our organization got carried away” (IKEA
Group, 2010). The same press release announced that the company had undertaken
multiple reviews of its operations in Russia, and that these reviews showed “large
deficiencies in several areas.” With regards to the problems surrounding bribery, IKEA
admitted in the statement that “there are indications that within IKEA MOS there has
been a culture of accepting third parties who have engaged in unethical business
practices.” The company committed itself to “strengthening its compliance and control
mechanisms in this area” (IKEA Group, 2010). It is unclear, however, whether these
efforts will be successful, and whether IKEA will be able to continue its growth and
expansion in the unpredictable Russian market.
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No matter what the future may hold for IKEA’s Russian operations, the problems
encountered in the country clearly and persuasively demonstrate that even the most
resourceful, creative business practices, implemented by a company with extensive
international experience, are subject to the uncertainties of the Russian market.
Corruption, and blat practices in particular, remains a deterrent to international
companies who would otherwise find significant success in Russia. For IKEA, despite
extensive efforts to adapt to the Russian market, the ultimate determinant of success or
failure was the incompatibility of Russian business practices with international ethics
standards. By trying to bridge this gap and engage in blat practices, IKEA found itself
embroiled in practices that, while acceptable in the Russian business environment, ran
entirely counter to the spirit of the company’s commitment to anti-corruption. IKEA,
even as one of the most experienced corporations in international market entry, was
unable to reconcile this conflict, and it ultimately led to the firing of top officials, the
suspension of investment in Russia, and the loss of significant amounts of potential
revenue. IKEA’s experience suggests that, at least for the time being, Western companies
will be unlikely to succeed in the Russian market because of the ethical problems
associated with blat. Even those companies, that, like IKEA, spend significant time and
effort learning about and participating in blat networks will eventually encounter ethical
problems.
IKEA’s experience with blat in the Russian business environment can be
instructive for other Western multinationals that are interested in investing there. While
the current state of the Russian business environment is not encouraging, there are some
tentative recommendations that can be drawn from knowledge of blat practices. IKEA’s
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experience indicates that while the use of blat and network capitalism may initially
provide Western corporations with multiple business advantages, it can ultimately lead to
ethical problems that can completely derail the company’s activity in Russia. Thus, the
recommendations of many scholars familiar with the Russian market, who advise that
Westerners avoid engaging in blat, seem most prudent (Barnes et al., 1997; Michailova &
Worm, 2003). Avoidance of blat may decrease the level of success of Western businesses
entering the Russian market, or prevent them from doing business there altogether.
However, this option is far preferable to the public relations and legal problems
associated with accusations of corruption.
If Western companies do shy away from investment in Russia, of course, it will
certainly be detrimental to the country’s integration into the world economy. Therefore,
Russia has a clear interest in discouraging the use of blat practices in business. Although
President Medvedev has announced his intent to combat corruption, little improvement
has actually been noted over the course of his four years as president. Furthermore, the
Russian government has only shown inclination to fight corruption when it surfaces
publicly. Instead, it should focus on discouraging those practices, including blat, that
create the conditions for corruption to occur. In the meantime, blat will continue to deter
Western corporations from investing in Russia, and to cause problems for those who do
choose to do business there.

Conclusion
This paper has shown how a peculiar social phenomenon, deeply rooted in the
idiosyncrasies of the Soviet system, continues to affect business in contemporary Russia.
The use of connections and personal favors to do business is particularly detrimental to
foreign investors, who are often excluded from the Russian networks that have formed.
Furthermore, attempts to participate in the blat system of Russian capitalism often lead
foreign companies into ethical quagmires and, consequently, public relations difficulties.
As demonstrated by IKEA’s experience in Russia, even the most well-prepared, cautious,
and creative companies will struggle with the challenges of blat. However, much research
remains to be done in order to fully understand the effect that blat practices have on
Western companies investing in Russia.
While the case of IKEA’s entry into the Russian market is instructive, it is just
one well-publicized example of the problems faced by foreign companies in Russia. In
order to perform a more conclusive assessment of blat’s effect on foreign investors, we
would need to examine the experiences of other foreign companies as well. A more
comprehensive survey of managers of Western multinationals who have invested in
Russia would provide much more information on the various problems foreign
companies encounter. Furthermore, it would allow us to trace the commonalities in
various companies’ experiences in order to determine more conclusively how blat
disadvantages Western firms. Although the case of IKEA was helpful in testing the
hypothesis that blat is detrimental to foreign companies, much more research remains to
be done to support these initial findings.
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The question that remains to be addressed is whether the trends observed in this
paper are likely to continue in the long term. Many observers of the Russian business
scene have predicted that as Russia becomes more integrated into the global economy,
the idiosyncrasies that have plagued its development in the past will begin to disappear,
and it will conform more to international norms. This would mean that foreign firms
would eventually find it easier to invest in Russia, as the barriers to entry – blat included
– disappear. However, as this paper has shown, blat is a deeply embedded cultural
phenomenon that has endured momentous political and economic transitions. It seems
unlikely, therefore, that the practice will disappear any time soon. In any case, it is clear
that blat is currently one of the main obstacles to investment, and therefore development,
in Russia. This paper serves as a cautionary tale both to foreign firms and to the Russian
government. For Western multinationals, the prevalence of blat practices and the
difficulties experienced by IKEA indicate that particular care is necessary when making
the decision to enter the Russian market. For the Russian government, the findings
outlined here demonstrate the importance of pursuing real reform that discourages blat.
Otherwise, Russian development will continue to stall, leaving it further and further
behind the rest of the global economy.
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